The paper deals with the continuous-time two person non-zero sum game extension of the no information secretary problem. The objects appear according to the compound Poisson process and each player can choose only one applicant. If both players would like to select the same one, then the priority is assigned randomly. The aim of the players is to choose the best candidate. A construction of Nash equilibria for such game is presented. The extension of the game with randomized stopping times is taken into account. The Nash values for such extension are obtained. Analysis of the solutions for different priority defining lotteries is given. r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The main topic of the paper is a game version of a continuous-time generalization of the secretary problem (SP). The part of long history of SP and its generalization has been presented in survey papers by Ferguson (1989) and Samuels (1991) . The game versions of the problem have been reviewed by Sakaguchi (1995) and Nowak and Szajowski (1998) . A continuous-time version of the SP with a random number of object in a finite time interval was investigated by Cowan and Zabczyk (1978) . Bruss (1987) extended this model by admitting a compound Poisson stream of options: a man has been allowed a fixed time T in which he has to find an apartment. Opportunities to inspect apartments occur at the epochs of a homogeneous Poisson process of unknown intensity l with exponential prior. He inspects each apartment immediately when the opportunity arises and decides instantly whether to accept it or not. At any epoch he is able to rank a given apartment amongst all those inspected to date, where all permutations of ranks are equally likely and independent of the Poisson process. The objective is to maximize the probability of selecting the best apartment from those (if any) available in the interval ½0; T. The problem considered in this paper should be seen as research toward 008 modeling environmental details, the relation between players (the decision makers) and circumstances of decisions. Let us be more specific.
Modeling relation between decision makers is important when there is only one stream of options (in continuous time modeled by some counting process). Two decision maker model of stopping the Markov process can be applied to investigate the competitive SP. A non-zero sum discrete time game approach considered by Szajowski (1994) gives model for the following situation. At each moment n ¼ 1; 2; . . . the decision makers (henceforth called Players 1 and 2) are able to observe the Markov chain sequentially. Each player has his utility function g i : E ! R, i ¼ 1; 2, and at each moment n each decides separately if he accepts or rejects the realization x n of X n . If it happens that both players have selected the same moment n to accept x n , then a lottery chooses Player 1 with a probability a n to give him the right (priority) of the acceptance while Player 2 is chosen with the probability 1 À a n . The player which has been rejected by the lottery may select any other realization x n in the later moments. Once accepted realization cannot be rejected, once rejected cannot be reconsidered. The aim of each player is to choose a realization which maximizes his expected utility. The problem considered by Fushimi (1981) was a trigger for the consideration of Szajowski (1994) . In fact, the problem will be formulated as a two person non-zero sum game with the concept of the Nash equilibrium as the solution. The problem with permanent priority for Player 1 (i.e. a n ¼ 1, n ¼ 1; 2; . . .) has been solved by Ferenstein (1992) . The continuous-time full-information two person SP with imperfect observation has been solved by Porosin´ski and Szajowski (1996) .
In this paper the game considered in Szajowski (1994) is generalized to the continuous-time version of the SP problem investigated in Bruss (1987) . The mathematical model will be presented and equilibria for each a defining priority will be derived in Section 4 where also interesting properties of some solutions are pointed out (see also conclusion in Section 5). The description of the stream of option is presented in Section 2 and the definition of the strategies and the solution in the game version are given in Section 3.
The optimal stopping of compound Poisson stream of options

Formulation of the best choice problem
Let S 1 ; S 2 ; . . . denote the arrival times of the Poisson process fN t g tX0 . For unknown intensity l an exponential prior density gðlÞ ¼ ae Àal I fl40g ðlÞ is assumed, where a is a known, positive parameter. By Bayes' theorem, the conditional posterior density is of the form
Àðsþ1Þl I fl40g ðlÞ; s 2 ½0; T and
Let ðj; sÞ denote the state of the process, when the option number j arrives at time s. Define the relative rank of the jth option by Y j and its absolute rank by X j (for details see Suchwa"ko and . Based on observation of the relative ranks and the moments of arrivals of the candidates the aim is to stop on the best option.
. . . ; Y N t g and let M be the set of all stopping times with respect to s-fields fF t g tX0 .
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One can consider the arrival times only and F n ¼ sfS 1 ; . . . ; S n ; Y 1 ; . . . ; Y n g, because F t for S n ptoS nþ1 is equivalent with F n . We can consider equivalently
Solution of the problem of stopping on the best
For further consideration we have x j ¼ ðj; S j Þ. Let us define
and
We have (see Gilbert and Mosteller, 1966 )
We calculate U j ðsÞ using (2) and (1) (see Bruss, 1987) :
Define the probability of realizing the goal doing one step more starting from ðj; sÞ: 
By the theory of optimal stopping we have W j ðsÞ ¼ maxfU j ðsÞ; V j ðsÞg for j ¼ 1; 2; . . ., s 2 ½0; T.
We have (see Bruss, 1987) 
Let B be the one-step look-ahead stopping region. It means that B is the set of states ðj; sÞ for which selecting the current relatively best option is at least as good as waiting for the next relatively best option to appear and then selecting it. Define additionally the average payoff for doing one step more by 
Therefore the set B is given by the formula B ¼ fðj; sÞ : U j ðsÞ À R j ðsÞX0g.
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In order to find the set B we are solving the inequality from (6). Let us define
Then B ¼ fðj; sÞ : sXs Ã g, where s Ã ¼ ðT þ aÞ=e À a and
I fsos Ã g .
The game with random priority
In the problem of optimal stopping the basic class of strategies M are Markov times with respect to s-fields fF n g 1 n¼1 . This class of strategies is not sufficient in the stopping game (see Yasuda, 1985) . A strategy for Player 1 (2) is a random sequence p ¼ ðp n Þ 2 P (q ¼ ðq n Þ 2 Q) such that, for each n: (i) p n ; q n are adapted to F n ; (ii) 0pp n ; q n p1 a.s..
Let fA i g 1 i¼1 and fB i g 1 i¼1 be i.i.d.r.v. of the uniform distribution on ½0; 1 and independent of Markov process ðx n ; F n ; P x Þ 1 n¼0 with the state space E ¼ N Â R þ . Let H n be the s-field generated by F n , fA i g n i¼1 and fB i g n i¼1 . A randomized Markov time lðpÞ for strategy p ¼ ðp n Þ 2 P and mðqÞ for strategy q ¼ ðq n Þ 2 Q are defined by lðpÞ ¼ inffnX1 : A n pp n g and mðqÞ ¼ inffnX1 : B n pq n g, respectively. We denote by K and M the sets of all randomized strategies of Players 1 and 2.
The random assignment of the priority to the player requires to consider the modified strategies. Denote T k ¼ ft 2 T : tXkg. One can define the set of strategiesK ¼ fðp; fs 1 n gÞ : p 2 P; fs 1 n g 2 T nþ1 for every ng and letM ¼ fðq; fs 2 n gÞ : q 2 Q; fs 2 n g 2 T nþ1 for every ng for Players 1 and 2, respectively. Let fB i g 1 i¼1 be i.i.d.r.v. uniformly distributed on ½0; 1, independent of W 1 n¼1 H n , and the lottery is given bȳ a ¼ ða 1 ; a 2 ; . . .Þ. DenoteH n ¼ sfH n ; B 1 ; . . . ; B n g and letT be the set of Markov times with respect to ðH n Þ 1 n¼0 . For every pair ðs; tÞ such that s 2K, t 2M we define The Markov times t 1 ðs; tÞ and t 2 ðs; tÞ are selection times of Players 1 and 2.
For each ðs; tÞ 2K ÂM and givenā the payoff function for the ith player is defined as f i ðs; tÞ ¼ g i ðX t i ðs;tÞ Þ. LetR i ðj; s; s; tÞ ¼ E ðj;sÞ f i ðs; tÞ ¼ E ðj;sÞ g i ðx t i ðs;tÞ Þ be the expected gain of ith player if the players use ðs; tÞ. We have defined the game in normal form ðK;M;R 1 ;R 2 Þ. This random priority game will be denoted by G rp . 
The pair ðv 1 ðj; sÞ; v 2 ðj; sÞÞ will be called the Nash value.
Assume that E ðj;sÞ jg i ðx n Þjo1, for ðj; sÞ 2 E. Denote h i ðj; sÞ ¼ sup t2T E ðj;sÞ g i ðx t Þ and s Ãi a stopping time such that h i ðj; sÞ ¼ E ðj;sÞ g i ðx s Ã i Þ for every ðj; sÞ 2 E, i ¼ 1; 2. Let G i ¼ fðj; sÞ 2 E : h i ðj; sÞ ¼ g i ðj; sÞg. We have s Ãi ¼ inffn : x n 2 G i g (see Shiryayev (1978) ). Denote s for each p 2 P, q 2 Q, whereh i ðj; sÞ ¼ E ðj;sÞ h i ðx 1 Þ. Denote R i ðj; s; p; qÞ ¼ E ðj;sÞ j i ðp; qÞ for every ðj; sÞ 2 E, i ¼ 1; 2.
We will use the following convention: if p 2 P then ðp n ; pÞ is the strategy belonging to P in which the nth coordinate is changed to p n . n gÞ 2M, is an equilibrium point. The value of the game is ðv 1 ð0; 0Þ; v 2 ð0; 0ÞÞ.
Two person best choice problem with random priority
Let us consider the two person game with random priority described in Section 3 related to the SP when the options are arriving according to the compound Poisson process. Based on the definitions of Section 2 and 3, when E ¼ N Â R þ , define g i ðj; sÞ ¼ U j ðsÞ, i ¼ 1; 2, ðj; sÞ 2 E. Let a i ¼ a for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . : We haveg 1 ðj; sÞ ¼ aU j ðsÞ þ ð1 À aÞV j ðsÞ,g 2 ðj; sÞ ¼ ð1 À aÞU j ðsÞ þ aV j ðsÞ. First of all we determine the equilibrium which gives the highest value for Player 1. By analysis of matrices (11) 
ARTICLE IN PRESS
maximal probability of success for Player 1 is given by (12) for aoa 0 and by (15) for aXa 0 . The Nash value for the equilibrium is (14) and (17), respectively.
Conclusion
Similarly as in consideration by Szajowski (1994) and Neumann et al. (2002) the other Nash equilibria can be constructed. There are similarities between the considered model and the asymptotic behavior of Nash equilibria for the non-zero sum game version of the SP with number of objects tending to infinity. It allows to use the results of Neumann et al. (2002) to get the set of all Nash solutions for the game G rp according to Definition 3.1. The optimal stopping problems for choosing non-extremal candidates show similar relations between the asymptotic solution of the finite horizon case and the solution for the Poissonian stream of option (see Suchwa"ko and Szajowski, 2003) .
